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Abstract
Predicting the federal funds rate and beating the federal funds futures market:
mission impossible? Not so. We employ a Markov transition process and show
that this model outperforms the federal funds futures market in predicting the
target federal funds rate. Thus, by using purely historical data we are able to better
explain future monetary policy than a forward looking measure like the federal
funds futures rate. The fact that the federal funds futures market can be beaten by
a statistical model, suggests that the federal funds futures market lacks eciency.
The mar- ket allocates too much weight to current Federal Reserve communication
and other real-time macro events, and allocates too little weight to past monetary
policy behavior.
Journal of Economic Literature Classification: E44, E47, E52, E58, G13
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1 Introduction
The Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) changes the target federal funds
rate in discrete steps. Since 1989 the FOMC has changed the target federal funds
rate in multiples of 25 basis points, and these changes have almost exclusively
been in the range (-50, 50). This makes the policy behavior of the FOMC an
ideal candidate for a Markov process, which predicts future monetary policy
by conditioning on past policy changes and nothing else. Surprisingly, we find
that the Markov transition process, in the vast majority of the cases we consider,
predicts the federal funds rate better than does the federal funds futures market.
Predicting the federal funds rate has preoccupied economists, banks, and finan-
cial market participants for decades. Several approaches have been employed:
financial asset prices, such as term federal funds, federal funds futures, term
Eurodollars, Eurodollar futures, T-Bills, and commercial paper; and time se-
ries models, such as Taylor-rules, random walks, AR(1) processes, VAR's, and
BVAR's. Of these approaches, financial asset prices, especially federal funds
futures prices, have been found to predict the federal funds rate the best. See,
for instance, Krueger and Kuttner (1996), Evans (1998), Robertson and Tall-
man (2001), Soederstroem (2001), Soederlind et al. (2003), Lang et al. (2003),
Piazzesi (2005), Piazzesi and Swanson (2006), Gurkaynak et al. (2007).
Prior to the late 1980s, the conventional wisdom was that central banking had
to be mysterious and secretive. This had the effect that financial markets and
the population at large considered monetary policy a black-box: un-systematic
and hard to predict. Unfortunately, a monetary policy that is un-systematic
and hard to predict, leads to large private sector expectational errors regarding
the course of future monetary policy and causes the economy to be less stable.
This is not the case anymore. During the last two decades, Federal Reserve
transparency, accountability, and credibility have improved markedly. Today
the Federal Reserve communicates its objectives and reasoning in a sound and
timely manner, and takes systematic steps (policy changes) to achieve its ob-
jectives of price stability and maximum employment.
Thanks to greater transparency and more systematic monetary policy, the Fed-
eral Reserve has earned greater credibility: people know that the Federal Re-
serve is committed to keeping inflation low and stable, so inflation and inflation
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expectations stay anchored at a low level. In such an economic environment,
the Federal Reserve is free, and able, to pursue its second objective of maximum
employment as well.
The greater transparency has been very helpful for the financial market's ability
to understand present and to predict future monetary policy, see, for example,
Poole (2000, 2005), Poole and Rasche (2000), and Swanson (2006). Greater
transparency has led to superior forecasting performance of financial assets, in
particular the federal funds futures prices, relative to traditional time series
models when it comes to predicting future monetary policy.
Yet, we are able to show that a simple Markov process has superior forecasting
ability in comparsion to the federal funds futures market during the period 2001-
2007, a period during which FOMC transparency was at a historical high. This
suggests that the federal funds futures market is not fully efficient.
The lack of efficiency in the federal funds futures market stems from three
sources. First, market participants often fail to properly combine Federal Re-
serve communication and real-time macroeconomic events with past policy be-
havior. Second, Federal Reserve communication may not have reached optimal-
ity: speaking with one voice and clearly setting a conditional path for future
monetary policy. Third, real-time macroeconomic data are inherently error
prone- something the Federal Reserve is aware of - and this may cause the
federal funds futures market to over-react in real-time.
The process towards greater transparency has been lengthy: in 1989 the FOMC
began to target the federal funds rate explicitly, change the federal funds rate in
multiples of 25 basis points, and make the target federal funds rate a multiple
of 25 basis points; in 1994 the FOMC started to make policy changes at eight
annual scheduled meetings1 and release a statement whenever the federal funds
rate was changed; in 1995 the statement began to include the target for the
federal funds rate, and a verbatim transcript was released with a 5 year lag; and
in 1999 the statement was augmented to include a description of the FOMC's
policy bias and released, not only after FOMC meetings when the target federal
funds rate was changed, but also after any FOMC meeting if the FOMC wanted
to communicate a major shift in the policy bias going forward.
1The FOMC may change the target funds rate in-between FOMC meetings, if need be,
but rarely does so. For instance, between November 2001 and July 2007, the FOMC changed
the target funds rate only at its scheduled meetings.
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Since 2000 the FOMC statement included a balance of risks assesment, instead
of the policy bias, and the statement was released after each meeting even if
the federal funds rate was left unchanged; since 2002 the statement included
each FOMC member's vote; beginning in 2003 the statement included forward
looking language; since 2005 the minutes were released with a 3 week lag.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 introduces the federal funds market and
how the FOMC conducts monetary policy. Section 3 presents the federal funds
futures market and how it prices and predicts the federal funds rate. Section 4
shows how a Markov process can be used to predict future federal funds rates.
Section 5 evaluates the forecasting ability of the federal funds futures market
and the Markov process. Section 6 concludes.
2 The Federal Funds Market
The Federal Reserve Act of 1978 specifies that the FOMC must promote max-
imum employment, low and stable inflation, and moderate long-term interest
rates. With these objectives in mind, the FOMC evaluates the current and
expected future state of the economy and charts a path for monetary policy.
Since 1982, the primary monetary policy instrument of the FOMC has been the
federal funds rate, either directly or indirectly. To be precise, effective June 6
1989, the FOMC began to target the federal funds rate explicitly.
The federal funds market is the inter-bank market where banks borrow and lend
reserves from and to each other. Banks participate in this market to make sure
that they satisfy their reserve requirement and to hedge that they have enough
funds to honor transactions over the Fed wire. The federal funds rate is the
rate at which banks make over-the-counter unsecured loans to each other on an
overnight basis.
The FOMC implements monetary policy by agreeing to a target rate for the
federal funds rate at each of its eight annual meetings. The FOMC agrees upon
a target rate in the form of a directive, and communicates this to the open
market trading desk at the New York Federal Reserve Bank. As a result, the
NY Fed performs open market operations (buys or sells Treasury securities) on
a daily basis to make sure that the daily effective federal funds rate stays as
4
close as possible to the target federal funds rate dictated in the FOMC directive.
The daily effective federal funds rate is the trade weighted average of all daily
actual funds rates. Open market operations for the most part are repurchase
agreements with very short maturities.
3 The Federal Funds Futures Market
The Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT) has been offering federal funds futures
contracts since October 1988. These contracts are designed to help banks and
financial market participants hedge against federal funds rate and short-term
interest rate volatility. Unlike a T-bill futures contract, which specifies the T-
bill rate on a specific future day, the federal funds futures contract is for the
simple average of the daily effective federal funds rate during a specific future
month. Each contract has a nominal value of $5 million, a settlement price of
100 minus the (expected) average effective federal funds rate for the month of
the contract, and can be written for the current month and for a month up to
24 months into the future.
The federal funds futures rate embodies the market's expectation of future mon-
etary policy. Market participants make commitments that are contingent on
what they believe the federal funds rate will be in the future, and they attempt
to use all available relevant information in forming their expectations about
future monetary policy.
Federal funds futures contracts are extremely liquid at expirations out to four
months, and still very liquid out to six months. Therefore, federal funds futures
prices represent an unbiased estimate of the market's expectations of monetary
policy up to half a year into the future.
The counterparty credit risk in these instruments is relatively small due to the
CBOT's daily mark-to-market and collateral requirements.
3.1 The Futures Rate
Standard asset pricing theory suggests that the rate of return at time t on a
financial instrument that is held from day t + j to day t + j + k, equals the
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expected rate of return from an investment strategy of rolling-over overnight
loans in the federal funds market from day t+ j to day t+ j+k, plus a possible
non-zero risk premium,
rt,t+j,t+j+k = Et
[
t+k−1∏
i=t
(1 + ffi+j)− 1
]
+ ρt,t+j,t+j+k, (1)
where rt,t+j,t+j+k is the rate of return, Et denotes the expectation conditional on
all available information up to period t, ffi+j is the overnight federal funds rate
on day i+ j, and ρt,t+j,t+j+k is the risk premium. See, for example, Campbell
et al. (1997) for a general analysis of asset pricing.
Equation (1) can be rearranged to look more intuitive and relevant for the
federal funds futures market,
rt,i = Etff t+i + ρt,i, (2)
where rt,i is the futures rate at time t for the i-months ahead futures contract,
ff t+i is the simple average of the daily effective federal funds rate during month
t + i, and ρt,i is the risk premium. Thus, the futures rate is a measure of
the market's prediction for the average effective federal funds rate during some
future month, after allowing for a possible non-zero risk premium.
The risk premium may be non-zero if banks - which regularly finance a signifi-
cant portion of their loan portfolios in the federal funds market - and financial
market participants - who often obtain financing by issuing short-term financial
instruments - also participate in the federal funds futures market. For instance,
if these institutions use the futures market to hedge against increases in the fed-
eral funds rate and short-term interest rates, respectively, and if they represent
the majority of trades, then the risk premium will be positive.
3.2 Predicting Monetary Policy
Two issues make it difficult to infer the market's expectation of FOMC behav-
ior from the federal funds futures rate directly: 1.) identifying the market's
expectation of the target rate and 2.) inferring the real-time risk premium.
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3.2.1 Identification
The fact that the futures rate is not a forecast of the target federal funds rate
leads to an identification problem. Specifically, equation (2) can be re-written
as follows,
rt,i = Etfftt+i + Et(ff t+i − fftt+i) + ρt,i, (3)
where fftt+i is the average target federal funds rate for month t+ i.
Equation (3) makes it clear that the risk premium adjusted futures rate may not
necessarily represent the market's forecast of the average target federal funds
rate. In particular, when the market expects the average effective federal funds
rate to differ from the average target federal funds rate in a given future month,
the risk premium adjusted futures rate no longer represents the market's pre-
diction of the average target federal funds rate.
An obvious identifying assumption is to assume that the market does not expect
the average effective and average target funds rates to deviate significantly from
each other, Et(ff t+i − fftt+i) = 0. Table 1 shows that this assumption is
supported by the data, both prior to and during our prediction period, from
November 2001 through March 2007.
Table 1: Effective vs. Target Federal Funds Rate
1994.1-2000.12 2001.11-2007.3
ff t+i − fftt+i 0.005 0.003
p-values (0.38) (0.25)
NOTE: p-values use Newey-West heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation
consistent standard errors.
The futures rate, adjusted for a possible risk premium, therefore can be inter-
preted as the market's expectation of the average target federal funds rate for
a given future month,
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rt,i = Etfftt+i + ρt,i. (4)
3.2.2 Risk Premium
Estimating the risk premium in real-time is not an easy task to perform. One
approach is to use the average historical risk premium as a substitute for the
real-time risk premium. This is the approach we take here.
To calculate the historical risk premiums, we rearrange equation (2) to arrive
at the following standard interest rate forecasting regression equation,
ff t+i = α+ βrt,i + εt, (5)
where the risk premium has been partitioned into a systematic (average) part,
α, and an irregular (stochastic) part, εt. To the extent that the risk premium
is time-varying, β will differ from unity according to the degree of correlation
between the futures rate and the stochastic risk premium. We therefore impose
the restriction β = 1 in equation (5) to ensure that the futures rate and the
funds rate differ statistically only in terms of a possible constant risk premium.
We use the negative of the estimated value of α in this restricted regression to
derive an estimate of the average risk premium ρ.
We look at each month of the year in which the FOMC meets and record how
that particular month's futures contract was trading 1.) one to six months
earlier, and 2.) one to four meetings prior.2 The monthly predictions are derived
by recording the closing prices of the futures contracts on the same day as the
FOMC meetings except one to six month earlier.3 The meetings predictions are
calculated by recording the closing prices of the futures contracts on the day
after each of the last one to four FOMC meetings.4
2If we use all twelve contracts of the year, the risk premiums will be much smaller, given
that the FOMC primarily changes the funds rate during the eight scheduled annual meetings.
3For example, if the FOMC meets on 9/16/2003, we record the closing price of the Sep-
tember 2003 futures contract on 8/16/2003, 7/16/2003, etc.
4For example, if the FOMC meets on 9/16/2003, we record the closing price of the Sep-
tember 2003 futures contract on 8/13/2003, 6/26/2003, etc.
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Table 2 makes it clear that the average risk premiums are positive, but not
statistically significant. Also, β never significantly differs from 1. Hence, there
is neither reason to believe that the risk premium on average is different from
zero, nor that it is time-varying during the period November 2001 through
March 2007.
Table 2: ff t+i = α+ βrt,i + εt
α β β = 1 ρ
Futures
One-month -0.00(0.88) 0.998(0.00) (0.77) 0.68(0.51)
Two-month -0.02(0.69) 0.995(0.00) (0.73) 2.88(0.45)
Three-month -0.04(0.54) 0.990(0.00) (0.66) 6.15(0.33)
Four-month -0.08(0.36) 0.996(0.00) (0.90) 8.57(0.30)
Five-month -0.15(0.25) 1.008(0.00) (0.88) 12.95(0.29)
Six-month -0.16(0.32) 1.003(0.00) (0.97) 15.56(0.29)
One-meeting -0.01(0.70) 0.999(0.00) (0.98) 0.77(0.53)
Two-meeting -0.04(0.40) 1.002(0.00) (0.88) 3.25(0.44)
Three-meeting -0.09(0.33) 1.003(0.00) (0.92) 8.07(0.35)
Four-meeting -0.15(0.33) 1.005(0.00) (0.95) 13.75(0.32)
NOTE: p-values are reported in parentheses and use Newey-West
heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation consistent standard errors. Sample
period: 2001.11-2007.3 with 8 annual observations (FOMC meetings),
sampled one to six month prior, and one to four meetings prior. The
average risk premium, ρ, is expressed in basis points (bp), whereas
α and β are expressed in decimals.
The monthly predictions almost have constant forecast horizons: the one-month
prediction varies from 28 to 31 days; the two-months prediction varies from 59 to
61 days; the three-months prediction varies from 89 to 92 days; the four-months
prediction varies from 120 to 123 days; the five-months prediction varies from
150 to 153 days; and the six-months prediction varies from 181 to 184 days prior
to the FOMC meeting date. However, the meetings ahead forecast horizons
vary considerably: the one-meeting ahead prediction varies from 34 to 58 days;
the two-meetings prediction varies from 70 to 106 days; the three-meetings
prediction varies from 112 to 154 days; and the four-meetings prediction varies
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from 162 to 204 days.
In Section 5 we assume that the average risk premiums we calculate here, were
the ones that financial market participants had in mind when operating in real-
time.
4 The Markov Transition Process
The FOMC changes the federal funds rate in discrete steps. Specifically, since
1989 the FOMC has changed the target federal funds rate in multiples of 25 basis
points; for the most part these changes have been in the range (-50, 50). This
kind of discreteness makes the policy behavior of the FOMC an ideal candidate
for a first order Markov process. With the policy changes following a first order
Markov process, our prediction of the target federal funds rate follows a second
order Markov process,
E(it+n| 4 it = xk) = it +
n∑
j=1
P jkx, (6)
where x is a vector of possible policy changes, xk is the realized policy change
at time t, P is the m×m transition probability matrix, P jk is row k of the j'th
multiple of matrix P , and it+n is the target federal funds rate n meetings from
time t. To be precise, we assume that x = (−50,−25, 0, 25, 50) and, therefore,
that P is a 5× 5 matrix.5
To facilitate a direct comparison with the federal funds futures rate, which is a
prediction for the average federal funds rate during a given future month, we
calculate and use the following weighted n meetings ahead prediction,
E(it+n| 4 it = xk) = ωt+n−1E(it+n−1) + ωt+nE(it+n), (7)
5Only once during the period 1990-2007 did the FOMC change the federal funds rate by a
number beyond our assumed rate changes: the target federal funds rate was increased by 75
bp in November 1994. We record this as a 50 bp change.
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where it+n is the average target federal funds rate, ωt+n−1 represents the fraction
of time prior to the FOMC meeting during the month of the FOMC meeting
n meetings ahead, and ωt+n is the fraction of time left in that same month n
meetings ahead. Hence, the n meetings ahead average target federal funds rate
prediction is a linear combination of the n − 1 meetings ahead prediction and
the n meetings ahead prediction for the target funds rate.
We use the period August 1990 through October 2001 to estimate the transition
matrix, and then use a rolling window during the period November 2001 through
March 2007 to predict the average target federal funds rate. The estimation and
prediction periods were selected because 1.) the FOMC begins to target the
federal funds rate and change the target rate in multiples of 25bp in June 1989,
and setting the target federal funds rate in multiples of 25bp in October 1989
(we decide to give the FOMC until August 1990 to get familiar with this new
practice), 2.) the period is of sufficient length to give us enough observations
(100 observations) from which to make accurate predictions, 3.) all changes
in the target federal funds rate between November 2001 and March 2007 take
place at scheduled FOMC meetings only, and we therfore have a consistent
model forecast horizon during this period, and 4.) the prediction period is of
sufficient length (44 observations) to draw statistical conclusions.
5 Forecasting Monetary Policy
To evaluate how accurately the federal funds futures market and the Markov
model predict the policy behavior of the FOMC, we evaluate the forecast per-
formance of each by calculating the root mean square error (RMSE) and the
mean absolute deviation (MAD). The data for the federal funds rate and the
federal funds futures rate are from Fred II and Barchart, respectively.
Table 3 reveals that the Markov model performs remarkably well.
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Table 3: Forecast Performance
Futures 1-month 2 3 4 5 6
RMSE 6.01 20.69 22.78 18.43 28.76 37.96
MAD 3.36 9.76 12.07 13.15 21.90 27.29
Futures 1-meeting 2 3 4
RMSE 7.15 12.12 22.08 35.19
MAD 4.19 8.64 16.12 25.84
Markov 1-meeting 2 3 4
RMSE 7.91 11.36 21.47 32.72
MAD 3.14 7.47 16.36 26.51
NOTE: Forecast period: 2001.11-2007.3. Results are
stated in basis points (bp).
The Markov model clearly outperforms the futures market in the meetings ahead
comparison in terms of RMSE, except for the one-meeting ahead prediction. In
terms of MAD, the Markov model predicts the federal funds rate best at the
one and two-meetings ahead forecast horizon.
To gauge the importance of the variability in the forecast horizon at the meetings
ahead predictions from the federal funds futures market (see section 4), we look
at monthly prediction errors as well. The relevant comparisons here are: one-
meeting model forecast (45 days) vs. one-month futures forecast (30 days) or
two-month futures forecast (60 days); two-meetings (91 days) vs. three-months
(91 days); three-meetings (136 days) vs. four-months (121 days) or five-months
(151 days); and four-meetings (181 days) vs. six-months (182).6
6The days reported are the average forecast horizons. As mentioned in section 4, the
monthly forecast horizons vary very little around their average.
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The RMSE performance measure has the Markov model outperforming the fu-
tures market in all cases, if the one-meeting model forecast is compared to the
two-month futures prediction and the three-meetings model forecast is com-
pared to the five-months futures prediction. The MAD measure, shows that the
Markov model outperforms the futures market in all comparisons, if the three-
meetings model forecast is compared to the five-months futures prediction.
Since the federal funds futures market is not able to surpass a purely backward
looking model in forecast accuracy, the market is not efficient. This lack of effi-
ciency in the federal funds futures market stems from market participants failing
to properly combine Federal Reserve communication and real-time macroeco-
nomic events with past policy behavior. Also, it is possible that the Federal
Reserve communication strategy needs to improve further: all FOMC members
must speak with one voice and clearly state a conditional path for future mon-
etary policy. Besides, real-time macroeconomic data are inherently error prone
- something the Federal Reserve takes into account in its decision making - and
that may cause the federal funds futures market to over-react in real-time.
Figures 1-8 show the prediction errors graphically, see appendix A.
6 Conclusion
Federal funds futures prices have up until now been considered the best fore-
caster of future monetary policy. To be precise, federal funds futures prices out-
perform other asset prices, such as the term federal funds rate, term Eurodollar
rate, Eurodollar futures, T-Bills, and commercial paper, but also outperforms
standard statistical models, such as the random walk, AR(1) processes, VAR's,
and BVAR's, as well as Taylor-rules.
We show that a simple Markov transition process can outperform the federal
funds futures market in forecasting future FOMC policy. Thus, we are able
to show that a model that only takes into account past monetary policy, and
doesn't incorporate FOMC member speeches, statements, minutes, Beige Book,
or other timely and forward looking information from the Federal Reserve, is
better at predicting the federal funds rate than the forward looking federal
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funds futures market. This implies that the federal funds futures market lacks
efficiency.
The market does not use the information in its information set efficiently: too
much emphasis is given to current Federal Reserve communication and other
macro events, and too little weight is put on past policy behavior. Besides,
Federal Reserve communication may not be optimal, and inherently error prone
real-time macroeconomic data may cause the federal funds futures market to
over-react in real-time.
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A Appendix
This appendix presents the Markov model and the federal funds futures market
prediction errors graphically.
Figure 1: The One Meeting Ahead Markov Model Prediction Errors vs. the
One Month Ahead Federal Funds Futures Prediction Errors
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Figure 2: The Two Meetings Ahead Markov Model Prediction Errors vs. the
Three Month Ahead Federal Funds Futures Prediction Errors
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Figure 3: The Three Meetings Ahead Markov Model Prediction Errors vs. the
Four Month Ahead Federal Funds Futures Prediction Errors
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Figure 4: The Four Meetings Ahead Markov Model Prediction Errors vs. the
Six Month Ahead Federal Funds Futures Prediction Errors
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Figure 5: The One Meeting Ahead Markov Model Prediction Errors vs. the
One Meeting Ahead Federal Funds Futures Prediction Errors
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Figure 6: The Two Meetings Ahead Markov Model Prediction Errors vs. the
Two Meetings Ahead Federal Funds Futures Prediction Errors
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Figure 7: The Three Meetings Ahead Markov Model Prediction Errors vs. the
Three Meetings Ahead Federal Funds Futures Prediction Errors
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Figure 8: The Four Meetings Ahead Markov Model Prediction Errors vs. the
Four Meetings Ahead Federal Funds Futures Prediction Errors
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